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The (Not Entirely) Financialized Enterprise –  
A Conceptual Proposal 
Michael Faust & Jürgen Kädtler ∗ 
Abstract: »Das (nicht ganz) finanzialisierte Unternehmen. Ein konzeptioneller 
Vorschlag«. Against the background of financialization being applied as a sort 
of catch-all category for corporate reorganization and especially the deteriora-
tion of labor and working conditions the paper presents the concept of the 
“multi-referential enterprise.“ Capital market expectations put established labor 
relations under a new pressure, but competing ideas remain relevant as a refer-
ence in both institutional reform processes and everyday decision making at 
firm level, including labor relations. Respective power positions also depend on 
rights anchored in labor law, collective bargaining, and labor market regula-
tions as well as on what happens to sources of primary power of the respective 
workforce due to labor market conditions, technological change, and pressures 
from value chain reorganization and globalization. Hence, what unions and 
works councils eventually have to concede in negotiations is not just a matter 
of the degree of financialization but of a variety of other structurations of the 
field and respective companies. 
Keywords: Financialization, labor relations, conventions, social fields, multi-
referential enterprise. 
1.   Introduction: Financialization – A Somehow “Fuzzy” 
Research Agenda 
Financialization, financial market capitalism, financialized capitalism, etc. have 
come up as core concepts in socio-economic analysis since the 1990s. These 
different concepts agree with each other in the common perception that finan-
cial markets and financial market actors have become more and more important 
for economic action and economic actors as well as for politics and the devel-
opment of capitalist societies.  
Thus different and differently accentuated issues have been subsumed under 
financialization, with their relevance and meaning changing over time. At the 
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beginning, the focus was on shareholder-value management and respective 
concepts of the enterprise and its governance, also addressed as “control-
financialization” (Deeg 2011). Subsequently a broader conceptualization came 
up, focusing more on macro-economic aspects such as the redistribution of 
incomes and profits, stemming increasingly from “financial channels” instead 
from trade and manufacturing (Krippner 2005; Epstein 2005), resulting in a 
hypertrophic expansion of the whole financial sector. This second strand that was 
also addressed as “profit-financialization” (Deeg 2011) often associated itself 
with the notion of an emerging new finance-led growth regime or in any case a 
new stage of capitalist development, also addressed as “strong financialization 
view” (Karwowski, Shabani and Stockhamer 2017, 3). And yet others were inter-
ested in the financialization of everyday life or in the implementation of finan-
cial indicators in any social situation (for an overview cf. van der Zwan 2014). 
In consequence, objections have been raised against a “conceptual [over] 
stretching” of the concept of financialization, when the tendency to cover ever-
larger object areas makes it become “fuzzy” at first or even an “empty abstrac-
tion” at last (cf. Engelen 2008, 113), thereby losing its heuristic capacity.  
However, it is not just heterogeneity in definitions and operationalization of 
financialization for empirical research that brings about contradictory results 
regarding the effects of financialization on investment, innovation, employ-
ment, working conditions, labor relations, etc. In addition, there is a lack of 
contextualization of mechanisms, and additional structurations that may com-
pete with or at least modify or specify the effects of financialization remain 
unconsidered. This becomes obvious in particular by transnational comparison, 
when varied institutional embeddedness modify, attenuate, divert, but in any 
case substantiate hypothized effects of financialization (Faust 2011; Gospel, 
Pendleton and Vitols 2014; Karwowski, Shabani and Stockhamer 2017). But 
also within national boarders such contextualization matters, with respect to the 
emergence of “institutional sub-systems” (Deeg 2005) or to “capitalist diversi-
ty” (Lane and Wood 2011) within national models of capitalism. As a result we 
witness varying degrees or “translations” of financialization, which are likely 
to modify its hypothetical “pure” effects. 
In the following, we focus on the financialization of the enterprise (control 
financialization). We concur with the critical appraisal of the state of financial-
ization research, especially with the skepticism with respect to comprehensive 
and detailed propositions concerning the effects of financialization on the en-
terprise. Against this background, in the following Section 2, we will discuss 
an ambitious proposal for a comprehensive concept of financialization, pre-
sented by Olivier Favereau (2016). In Section 3 we will develop our own heu-
ristic for the empirical analysis of financialization(s) on the company level, 
referring to a concept of social fields inspired by Jens Beckert (2010), in which 
the enterprise remains multi-referential. In Section 4 we will demonstrate the 
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empirical relevance of our argument, drawing on empirical research in the 
German context. Section 5 presents some brief conclusions. 
2. Financialization as a “Great Deformation" 
An ambitious concept of financialization proposing to integrate the micro-, 
meso-, and macro-dimensions of economic action has been presented recently 
by Olivier Favereau (2016). Favereau draws on a heuristic of “stylized facts,” 
proposed by Nicholas Kaldor originally as a methodology to characterize given 
growth regimes based on empirical observation. Presenting two lists of stylized 
facts, characterizing – “as consensually as possible” (Favereau 2016, 2) – re-
cent developments of the financial sphere and of labor relations, the author’s 
ambition is “to prove and explain a meaningful relationship between these two 
orders of phenomena” (ibid.). So the intention is explicitly to go beyond pre-
senting more or less plausible correlations but to identify causal mechanisms 
constituting an integrated theory of financialization and its implications espe-
cially for labor and labor relations.1 
The linchpin of the approach is the assumption of “a Great Deformation of 
the historic and legal nature of the typical enterprise” (ibid.) by the establish-
ment of “a new regime of inter-subjectivity and normativity” (ibid., 37, empha-
sis in original). On the one hand, there is the legal perception and the effective 
reconfiguration of the enterprise as a “nesting of [contractual] agency relations” 
(ibid., 41), focused on aligning the interests of managers to those of sharehold-
ers as owners and residual claimants. On the other hand, there is the implemen-
tation of an all-encompassing system of quantified evaluation and reporting, 
making the reality of financial numbers the only reality individuals in the com-
pany may refer to in order to justify themselves and their performance. It is the 
legal dimension of this transformation that is put forward as essential. The 
enterprise is not just perceived as a nesting of agency relations with sharehold-
ers as residual and (therefore) decisive claimants, as one conventional perspec-
tive among others. This perception becomes material reality by de facto institu-
tionalization, caused by a reinterpretation of existing corporate law based on 
agency theory and by this reinterpretation becoming generally binding. As a 
result of this twofold transformation agency on the meso and the micro level is 
presented as being unilaterally and unambiguously determined by the pressure 
                                                             
1  We understand the concept presented as one addressing financialization in general and not 
a particular case, and we take the analysis of the financialized (or deformed) enterprise as 
dealing with an empirically founded real type. However, there remains some ambiguity 
when the author refers positively to codetermination and the German and Scandinavian 
model (Favereau 2016, 65) for alternative perspectives, which are also financialized (more or 
less or in a particular manner). 
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of shareholders on management. And the perspective of homo oeconomicus is 
presented as the only (or at least the only relevant) effective guideline for indi-
vidual action within the enterprise: 
In the same way as the enterprise is forcefully restored to the control of the 
company (société anonyme in French), the ordinary person – whether or not 
he or she so wishes – is returned to the control of homo oeconomicus, with 
whom everyone must comply. Economy has its reasons which Reason cannot 
simply ignore, but must honour. Financialisation, at an anthropological level, 
is homogeneous with everything we have identified, at the meso-economic 
level (the enterprise). (Favereau 2016, 59, emphasis in original) 
Making the interlock between agency theory and the omnipresence of quanti-
fied in-depth controlling and evaluation, the core of financialization on the 
company level is obviously a very promising concept. However, in its actual 
version, we see two shortcomings to be dealt with. Firstly we question the 
assumption that the financialized company could be nothing but financialized, 
i.e., completely determined by agency theory and quantified controlling. And 
secondly we do not see that all deterioration of working conditions and labor 
relations characterized (quite) adequately by stylized facts can be explained by 
financialization. The principal focus of what follows will be on the first topic. 
With respect to the second we will confine ourselves to some casual remarks. 
2.1  Financialization and Management – No Choice? 
March (1988), Simon (1979), but also Child (1997), Bernoux (1995), and not 
least convention theorists portrayed the reality of the enterprise/corporation as 
the situated outcome of bargaining, negotiating, and strategic choice, based on 
“bounded rationality” and on a plurality of rationalities and interest, drawing on 
more or less stable power resources and structures of opportunity. In contrast, 
Favereau in his recent analysis presents the financialized enterprise as corpo-
rate governance theory and concepts of shareholder value management and 
homo oeconomicus brought to strict organisational and even anthropological 
reality. Accordingly the agency of individuals in business organizations ap-
pears as being reduced to individual rational choice behavior instead of being 
based on the capacity to navigate between different conventional rationalities, 
as convention theorists such as Dodier (1991) or Boltanski and Thévenot 
(2006) explicitly supposed.2 As a result, we find a somehow paradoxical dialec-
tic, at least against the background of our reading of conventional economics: 
Developed mainly as a fundamental critic of neoclassical rational choice theory 
under the conditions of financialization they seem to end up with delivering an 
                                                             
2  Our reading of convention economics or convention theory refers to the logic of “grammar” 
of different orders of justification developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (not so much on 
their specific inventory of cités) and to a perception of legitimacy and rationality as inter-
twined dimensions of “justification.” 
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alternative explanation for the performativity of rational-choice economics as 
an empirical reality. 
As the actors (de facto reduced to agents) on the meso and micro level of the 
enterprise are perceived as being locked hermetically in the logic of this ar-
rangement, the impetus for revising the deformation of the enterprise and 
bringing it “back to work” (Favereau 2016, 70) can only come from outside via 
political intervention establishing an alternative legal framework. 
On closer inspection, there are considerable weaknesses to be recognized in 
this strong and encompassing concept of financialization. These refer particu-
larly to one “stylized fact,” when stylized facts are defined as descriptions of 
empirical economic reality “as consensual as possible” (Favereau 2016, 2). 
Favereau introduces the “loss of independence of management in relation to 
finance” (Favereau 2016, 15) as the first and fundamental “stylized fact” refer-
ring to the sphere of the enterprise and labor relations. However, this is rather 
not a consensual empirical fact, but a theoretical proposal full of ambitious and 
controversial preconditions. It is by no means evident to what extent a particu-
lar constellation of corporate ownership (like that of listed companies) and 
respective governance principles could provide an explanation for management 
behavior and labor relations in general. In Germany, for example, listed com-
panies with stock widely held by institutional investors, represent only a sub-
segment of the whole economy (Faust and Thamm 2016), whereas the van-
guards of labor flexibilization like hard discount retailers have been exclusively 
family-owned companies with no “shareholders” at all. So even if we suppose 
shareholder value management as completely effective and efficient, it could 
by no means be a sufficient explanation for general developments or working 
conditions and labor relations, characterized by the second set of “stylized 
facts.” 
Favereau’s solution for this problem seems to be the introduction of the 
aforementioned “regime of inter-subjectivity which financialization has con-
tributed to establishing” (Favereau 2016, 45, emphasis in original), based on 
“the convention of individual evaluation by numbers” (ibid.) and resulting in a 
“standard management framework in which enterprises (from SMEs to the 
largest multinationals) have approached the age of financialisation” (Favereau 
2016, 51). However, there seems to be a sort of circularity in this argument, 
with the “regime of inter-subjectivity” as explanans and as explanandum with 
respect to financialization at the same time. One might assume that methods of 
evaluation that were originally developed in a perspective of shareholder con-
trol became generalized as best practice of efficient management. However, in 
this case, the adoption by managers and owners beyond shareholder-owned 
companies would be based not on dependency but on (strategic) choice. 
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2.2.  The (Un)Ambiguousness of Numbers 
Shareholders of listed corporations are not unambiguously and unilaterally able 
to inforce their interest and will on managers of these firms as Favereau sug-
gests. Strategic choice is not only a matter of managers with less demanding or 
passive owners; it is an essential implication of any management. There is no 
doubt that the rise of agency theory as a dominant conception of the enterprise 
and the implementation of comprehensive evaluation tools focused on financial 
indicators have significantly increased the influence of financial rationality in 
and on non-financial companies. Nevertheless, in our view Stark’s concept of 
entrepreneurship, perceived not as a personalized but as an organizational 
quality remains relevant for financialized companies: as the “exploitation of 
ambiguity” and “the ability to keep multiple orders of worth in play and to 
exploit the resulting overlap” (Stark 2000, 5). The general and especially the 
legal acceptance of agency theory and the generalization of financialized eval-
uation tools have significantly strengthened the bargaining position of actors 
that are able to refer to them efficiently. But they have not and could not elimi-
nate the opportunities for and the necessity of choice and bargaining. 
The decisive actors and the most prominent beneficiaries of financialization 
in contemporary capitalism are people in strategic management positions or top 
positions in financial intermediation. And their common powerbase is not the 
unambiguousness of financialization, but the fact that financialized require-
ments can and must be interpreted and weighted against each other as well as 
against other relevant situated aspects. This does not create a unified perspec-
tive. The spaces for interpretation and the trade-offs that managers in the real 
economy have to deal with differ from those financial intermediaries face, even 
where the former have an affinity to financial markets. Moreover, the institu-
tional investors’ interests and business models are quite heterogeneous and not 
necessarily compatible with each other. This constellation does not constitute a 
consistent social logic of valorization. What it does lead to in large companies 
is a tendency for constant restructuring at various levels, as well an increasing 
opportunism in labor relations. 
Accordingly a heuristically fruitful approach to financialization of the enter-
prise should start with the presumption that financialization does not and could 
not mean that the enterprise is nothing but financialized. Within such a concep-
tual framework the enterprise that is exclusively financialized and this in all its 
dimensions, as portrayed by Favereau (2016), could be conceived as an edge 
case within such an conceptual framework, which has undergone such a severe 
“deformation” that it ceases to be a real economy enterprise that still produces 
some use value and is part of a wider society.  
We conclude that we need a concept of (control-)financialization that allows 
for ambiguity and multi-referentiality and avoids “conceptual stretching” and 
the resulting fuzziness (Engelen 2008, 113). Thereby, we try to develop a pre-
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cise, that is to say a non-overlapping definition of financialization that does not 
per se include potential effects (weakened innovativeness, precarization, dete-
rioration of working conditions, etc.) as “two sides of a coin.” 
3. Control-Financialization – Conceptual Considerations 
The term financialization, seen from its origins, can be conceived as a 
disengagement from terms like “Financial Market Capitalism” (Windolf 2005) 
and similar terms that indicate a cohesive capitalist formation or stage. Scholars 
who use such notions of a capitalist formation always have to emphasize and 
justify a specific aspect, feature, or logic of societal structure or development 
vis-à-vis other features or logics that are equally conceivable and arguable. One 
only needs to think of the nowadays popular “digital capitalism.” “Financial 
Market Capitalism” goes along with the notion of a dominance of financial 
markets and their main actors vis-à-vis other markets, subsystems, or 
organizations. And indeed, the version of Financial Market Capitalism, 
prominent in Germany (Windolf 2005) insinuates that powerful institutional 
investors, guided by a single and unambiguous definition of interest and 
accordingly a unambiguous logic of action, are authorized and capable to 
impose their will on to all other actors in and around the enterprise. The result is a 
new economic formation that is universally governed by a financial market logic. 
In contrast, the concept of financialization introduced by Froud et al. (2006) 
expressly avoids such a straightforward theoretical deduction. They favor a 
more open concept of financialization. For a start they acknowledge that the 
management of listed corporations nowadays not only have to position 
themselves in competitive product markets but also have to explain and justify 
their strategies and results vis-à-vis capital market actors so that the latter have 
an impact on what the former do and say. We follow this more open concept of 
financialization. It has the following advantages. First, it does not suspend the 
connection between product and capital markets. Instead, the positioning of the 
firm on product as well as labor markets remains a main point of reference for 
the observations and assessments by capital market actors. And it remains a 
main point of reference also for the narratives by which management portrays 
the firm vis-à-vis the capital market. Second, the reference to both product and 
capital markets precludes the possibility to strictly deduce what maximization 
of shareholder value could mean as a target, not least because the market value 
of the firm is determined by factors that are not under control of management. 
Third, financialization should not be identified on the basis of fixed effects as, 
for instance, in the change of principles from formerly “retain and invest” to 
“downsize and distribute” as assumed by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000). 
Effects are rather “conjunctural, contradictory, and non-totalising” (Savage and 
Williams 2008, 8). If scholars assign particular effects such as weak growth 
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and decreasing innovativeness (Deutschmann 2005) or precarization of work 
(Dörre 2009; Brinkmann and Dörre 2005) they should take into account 
varying degrees of financialization and other contexts varying in time and 
space. Effects should not be insinuated by merely refering to an alleged new 
stage of capitalist development. 
By highlighting these advantages we have already pointed out the aspects by 
which our own conceptual approach (layed out in more detail in Faust and 
Kädtler 2017) goes beyond the Froud et al. (2006) concept. They more or less 
implicitly assume that financialization takes place in a particular institutional 
and structural setting, which is characterized by stock market listing, a 
shareholder friendly corporate governance, and financial investors being the 
dominant shareholders. We, however, decidedly define financialization as 
multidimensional and explicitly allow different degrees or shapes of 
financialization in each of the dimensions. In doing so, we resort to two more 
general sociological concepts: a concept of economic fields informed by a 
pragmatist theory of action following Jens Beckert (2010) as well as a concept 
of the “multi-referential enterprise” making pragmatic use of various concepts 
from organization theory.  
In this field concept three types of social structures have an impact on 
economic action and hence are relevant for the explanation of social and 
economic outcomes: (1) Institutions that provide rules in the sense of rights and 
obligations (Streeck and Thelen 2005b) or “criteria of rationality” (Lepsius 
1997) that are made obligatory by means of sanctions and/or the recourse to 
some “third party”; (2) social networks that represent the relational and 
structural embeddedness of actors and provide resources and define power 
positions;3 (3) “cognitive frameworks” that comprise guiding ideas 
(“Leitideen,” Lepsius 1997) or “conventions” (Diaz-Bone 2011; Kädtler 2011) 
that are used to explain and justify actions and institutions as well as 
normatively or cognitively stylized concepts of action and organizing in the 
sense of “rationalized myths” (Meyer and Rowan 1977).4  
In any particular situation all three structures have simultaneously an impact 
on actions and on interaction, that is to say each structure “operates” under the 
stipulation and limitation of the other structures in a complementary or 
contradictory relationship. For instance, each situated actor interprets his or her 
conditions for acting in the light of available and more or less authorized 
cognitive frames. Actors in situ interpret and apply the obligatory institutional 
rules in the light of cultural background assumptions. And they assess the 
behavioral impact of these rules in the light of their particular position in a 
given actor constellation. Reversely, the conditions for action of actors 
                                                             
3  For network constellations, we synonymously use the term actor constellations (“Akteurs-
konstellationen”).  
4  Regarding these distinctions and the relevant scholarly literature see Faust and Kädtler (2017). 
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positioned in a particular way only become visible to the actor in the light of 
institutional rules that authorize particular positions, grant rights, and/or impose 
obligations to them (see in more detail: Beckert 2010; Faust and Kädtler 2017). 
Therefore, none of these structures is conceived as determining action, 
moreover, the simultaneous impact of all structures is not likely to work in one 
direction in a kind of hyper determination. Rather the multiple structuring of 
fields implies the possibility of dynamic change because creative actors may 
refer to each of the structures in order to gain a better position by influencing 
one of the other structures. For instance, actors may use new, challenging 
cognitive frames to delegitimize the guiding ideas or criteria of rationality of 
the prevailing institutions. This may result either in an explicit rule change or in 
a modified interpretation and application of these rules, for example, as it may 
initiate a gradual, but nevertheless transformative institutional change as 
proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005a). 
Because the economic actor in our concept is a firm, i.e., an organization as 
a collective and not an individual actor, an enduring social system that 
develops resources and capabilities and attracts a variety of interests over time, 
we specify the field concept by introducing the corresponding concept of the 
multi-referential enterprise. It reflects in its decisions and internal structure its 
multiple and inconsistent embeddedness in structural, institutional, and 
cognitive-cultural respect. This has the following implications. The creativity 
of the actor refers to the notion of strategic choice (Child 1997) by which 
management positions the firm in a certain environment, and in doing so 
chooses those framework requirements the company has to deeal with. And at 
the same time management defines and develops its resources and capabilities 
and maintains its social cohesion. In a capitalist environment with competitive 
markets, creativity inevitably refers to innovation and the maintenance of a 
basic capacity to innovate is regarded as an organizational task. The 
development of strategies (including the choice of organizational structures) 
depends on the perception and interpretation of environmental demands and 
expectations as well as internal capabilities. Both tasks are performed as a 
distributed activity involving a variety of functions, hierarchical levels, 
professional groups, management factions and boundary-spanning units across 
the organization even if final decision-making needs the authority of top 
management. 
The different functionally and/or professionally defined sub-units observe 
and interpret particular task environments in which the organization operates. 
As boundary-spanning units they are responsible for the relationship to 
particular stakeholders, recognize and translate their demands and expectations 
for internal purposes but also represent the organization and its interests vis-à-
vis these stakeholders. They interpret and translate various institutional rules 
into organizational routines but also try to influence institutional rule making 
that is pertinent for the organization by lobbying. As members of specific 
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professional communities, trained and socialized in particular professional or 
occupational cultures, they represent and introduce specific insights, world-
views or partial rationalities into the process of strategy building but also into 
day-to-day organizational activities. 
Based on these considerations we propose to define financialization of the 
enterprise with respect to all three structures as follows: 
1) Financialization in the network dimension is characterized by changing 
structures of ownership and supervision that go along with an increasing 
influence of “new owners,” i.e., organized and professionally operating 
financial investors, at the expense of previously prevalent categories of 
shareholders. The latter could be regarded either as influential, but patient 
(banks, insurance companies, families, other companies) or as passive, 
isolated, and uninfluential (small, private shareholders). Different degrees 
of financialization in this dimension can be identified by typical actor 
constellations; the vanishing point of financialization in this respect is in 
accordance with most literature the “vulnerable,” listed corporation with 
stock widely scattered and held by institutional investors (Faust and 
Thamm 2016).  
2) Financialization in institutional respect is characterized by the 
establishment of new rules for corporations and financial markets that 
grant rights and enhance influence of nowadays more organized minority 
shareholders vis-à-vis management, other groups of owners, creditors, 
and employees and imposes obligations on the firm.  
3) In cognitive-cultural respect Financialization is characterized by new 
guiding ideas of management and corporate governance, which provide 
the munition for reforms on institutional level and equip actors on 
company level with new registers of explanation and justification. This 
change of ideas can be based on the rise of new theories and heuristics in 
the corresponding scholarship (especially financial economics), which 
are also adopted for the assessment and valuation of firms at the stock 
exchange (e.g., Capital Asset Pricing Model, Discounted Cashflow). This 
change of cognitive frameworks refers to the rise of new theories of 
legitimation such as agency theory, which justifies why the “residual 
income receiver” should also be granted the residual control rights and 
why the reward system of managers should in the first instance be 
aligned with shareholder interests. Moreover, scholars and consultants 
also develop new recipe knowledge as to how shareholder value 
orientation should be organized and which strategy recipes should be 
favored (concentration on core businesses, narratives for the equity 
story).5 
                                                             
5  When defining financialization in the cognitive-cultural dimension most problems occur in 
distinguishing the phenomenon to related concepts or terms like economization or moneti-
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The structuration of fields may procede in a way that financialization is 
complemented and enhanced by the concurrence of all three dimensions. But 
this should only be seen as a conceivable case of an ideal type realization as 
provided as vanishing point by stagist theories of capitalist formation. For real 
world analyses different degrees or shapes of financialization should be 
regarded as possible in each dimension for each of which we need to develop 
appropriate measuring concepts or typologies (Faust and Thamm 2016). This 
includes that in principle financialization may vary independently in all three 
dimensions. This comprises cases in which firms use capital market oriented 
valuation metrics or management concepts although they are not listed on stock 
markets and hence financial investors do not raise their voice here. Moreover, 
allowing for different degrees of financialization includes the notion that the 
financialization of a firm or of a larger unit of investigation (field, national 
economy) may vary in both directions over time. The process of 
financialization may cease because the new institutional rules only have a 
limited coverage (e.g., only apply to listed corporations) or because other 
guiding ideas or conventions, subdued for some time, regain influence, by 
which the power structure of the field changes again in favor of other 
stakeholders; the process of financialization may even be reversed if a former 
change of rules meets resistance and rules are changed again, for instance, 
because the advantages of patient capital have been rediscovered. In short: also 
definancialization should be kept conceivable. Finally, financialization is only 
an aspect-related (not a total) characterization of the enterprise. On a company 
level therefore inevitably regarding all three dimensions, other structures 
remain valid and influential. Enterprises operate in product, procurement, labor 
and capital markets and hence are exposed to the different stakeholders 
interacting in these markets as well as to the different rules typical for these 
environmental segments. This multi-referentiality is also valid for the 
cognitive-cultural framing. Therefore, enterprises can be financialized to varying 
degrees but they cannot be merely financialized (Faust and Kädtler 2017).  
This multiple and potentially conflictual embeddedness of the multi-
referential enterprise has its correspondence within the organization, the firm. 
Financialization strengthens all those functions, professions, and boundary-
spanning units (especially finance, investor relations) that are exposed to and 
communicate with shareholders and analysts, share professional understandings 
with capital market actors and/or perceive their role as the advocate of a 
financial market rationality, and fulfil the obligations that new rules of 
                                                                                                                                
zation (Chiapello 2015). This is reflected in the identification of metrics used in manage-
ment by objectives that are deemed typical for financialization (see Latniak 2016; Faust and 
Thamm 2016). We advocate a narrow version in which metrics are related to financial eco-
nomics and capital markets. Ordinary metrics designed for (internal) cost control have been 
used for decades in industrial rationalization.  
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corporate governance have imposed on the corporation. To varying degrees 
financialization going along with a shift in the external coalition leads to a shift 
in the internal power structure and may thus change the internal coalition 
(Mintzberg 1983). However, as long as other stakeholders remain relevant for 
the success of the firm and its legitimation, other notions of the company and 
its economic and societal mission remain relevant. These find advocates within 
the firm (such as human resource management addressing employees and their 
representatives) if the stakeholders may raise their voices. Other institutional 
rules impose (often) conflicting rights and obligations (as e.g., 
codetermination) that also have to be reflected in the internal structure. The 
firm remains multi-referential, struggling internally for compromises between 
financialization and complementary or competing logics or conventions. The 
task to find out how these movements and resulting adjustments look like on a 
case-to-case basis and which effects they produce has to be given over to 
empirical analyses that look for typical constellations and its effects.  
4.  The Ideas of Financialization and Its Uneven and 
Contested Realization in Strategy Formation and 
Institutional Change 
For Favereau agency-theory and the related “convention of the shareholder-
owned enterprise” is a cornerstone of the “Great Deformation” of the enter-
prise, “in relation to which everyone must determine themselves” (Favereau 
2016, 38). We concur with Favereau in acknowledging agency-theory as a 
central concept in the idea-world of financialization. We also agree that “eco-
nomic theory (that of finance and of agency) opens up room for justification of 
the financialization movement” (Favereau 2016, 40). However, we do not 
agree with the notion that the new ideas turned the financialization movement 
“unassailable” (Favereau 2016). Instead we maintain that the new ideas remain 
contested and disagree with his conclusion that these ideas have been realized 
determinately, evenly, and uncontestedly, neither in strategy formation nor in 
the change of institutional rules. In the remainder of this section we try to show 
that our concept is better equipped to analyze the process of an uneven and 
contested process of financialization. We do so with reference to the German 
experience but believe that it carries more general arguments that are also valid 
for other national contexts.  
Undoubtedly, agency-theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) ranks among the 
key ideas of control financialization, informing the external evaluation and 
exertion of influence by capital market actors, corporate strategy formation as 
well as the political process of institutional reform. Its rise from an esoteric 
niche within the academic milieus of the 1970s to a central theory of legitima-
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tion for shareholder primacy first occurs in the US in the interplay with the 
early rise of the institutional investor there (Davis and Thompson 1994; Lordon 
2000; Lazonick 2017). When in the 1990s in Germany financialization started 
to develop and institutional investors gained ground as the natural carriers of 
agency theory, it could rely on the already existing transnational channels and 
carriers by which the new knowledge and the urgency to follow it could be 
transferred from the Anglo-Saxon world. However, also in the heydays of 
agency-theory in US-dominated management scholarship there remained an 
ideational and conceptual contest between the Shareholder Value doctrine and 
the competing “Stakeholder Approach” (Freeman 1984, 2010; Donaldson and 
Preston 1995). Similarly, in German business economics despite the newly 
emerging priority claim of financial economics the quarrel did not end up in a 
surrender of the other sub-disciplines and their knowledge claims. Whereas 
some representatives of Human Resource Management (HRM) subordinate 
themselves at least rhetorically and spotlight their concepts under the new 
headline of “value-oriented” HRM, this by no means is valid for the bulk of 
HRM scholarship (Aust et al. 2015; Gerpott 2015; Lang and Rego 2015); even 
among the new headline of “value orientation” we find stakeholder-oriented 
approaches that declaredly depart from a shareholder value orientation (Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft Engere Mitarbeiter der Arbeitsdirektoren Fachausschuss 
1/01 2004; Faust et al. 2011, 213-8; Vormbusch 2012). Also within manage-
ment accounting (“Controlling”), a subject that seems most dedicated to the 
shareholder value doctrine and produced a bulk of textbooks for practitioners 
(Schierenbeck and Lister 2002), there is still intellectual competition between 
competing concepts in which “value-based” approaches have no priority 
(Scherm and Pietsch 2004). In a similar vein, in the same period in which “val-
ue-based management” was on the rise, also the “Balanced Scorecard” (Kaplan 
and Norton 1997) as a competing management concept witnessed considerable 
response. It was conceptualized by its authors as a correction to a one-sided and 
short-term financial orientation and correspondingly criticized by Jensen as a 
“managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory” und thus as aberrance from the 
true doctrine (Jensen 2002, 235). 
This short outline of the German debate should have demonstrated that the 
new ideas have gained ground since the 1990s but remain contested by compet-
ing ideas, which again may gain ground themselves when the realization of the 
new ideas of financialization have shown their “deforming” effects. Thus we 
refrain from the notion that new ideas just outcompete existing ones all the 
more as competing ideas still have social carriers that are interested and have 
the power to bring them to the fore. Or in other words: there are still various 
orders of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) on offer to which actors can 
refer in order to explain and justify their decisions and course of action. In 
which constellations which ideas matter and are made relevant, in how far and 
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which kind of compromise are necessary then needs to be analyzed from case 
to case empirically. 
4.1 Ideational Change and Its Contested and Incomplete 
Institutionalization 
We now turn to such an uneven and contested realization of the convention or 
the new ideas of financialization. Agency-theory and its popularized versions 
also provided the ideational horizon for the institutional reforms having been 
introduced stepwise since the mid-1990s. This refers to the strengthening of 
(minority) shareholder rights vis-à-vis insiders, disclosure and transparency 
requirements, the admittance of stock options for a capital market oriented 
remuneration of management, the enabling of share buy-back programs in the 
interest of current shareholders, and the implementation of takeover rules that 
set narrow confines for managers to oppose unfriendly takeover bids (Höpner 
2003; Jackson and Sorge 2012; Faust 2013). All this means that core regula-
tions have been implemented in order to accomplish a “market for corporate 
control,” deemed necessary to discipline managers to act in the interest of 
shareholders as the “residual claimants.” After a surge of reforms Germany has 
been acknowledged as a poster-boy of a shareholder-friendly corporate govern-
ance, especially in terms of implementation of the “One Share, One Vote” 
principle or takeover rules (Jackson and Sorge 2012), the latter offering US 
managers via “poison pills” more scope for defense. Agency-theory also pro-
vided a new or a newly accentuated justification for the refusal of codetermina-
tion among entrepreneurs and managers, not least in family owned companies.6 
The claimants of the (only) residual income (shareholders) should also have the 
residual control rights – this was the new mantra now also preached in leading 
business journals (Schmid and Seger 1998). International investors would be 
discouraged to invest because they would have to reckon with higher capital 
costs having a negative impact on the competitiveness of the German business 
location. In the face of the permanent and relentless criticism brought forward 
by the umbrella organizations of trade and industry, backed by liberal politi-
cians and important voices from the academia one could doubt whether the 
core principles of codetermination would remain untouched, especially when 
considering that other shareholder-friendly reforms had already been intro-
duced or were on the agenda.  
However, the radical critics of codetermination from the business associa-
tions did not dominate the public debate. For the unions any confinement of 
codetermination was not negotiable. Although the red-green coalition govern-
ment partially followed the new credo by introducing shareholder-friendly 
reforms, it strictly kept hold of German codetermination and other peculiarities 
                                                             
6  Regarding this debate see Jackson (2005) and Faust (2011). 
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of German corporate governance (two-tier board). The failed attempt of the 
conservative and liberal parties in 2005 to gain a majority in the German par-
liament with a neo-liberal program, finally lead to a newly adjusted public 
debate. The newly built grand coalition embraced the basic ideas of the aca-
demic members of the official commission on codetermination (Mitbes-
timmungskommission 2006; Streeck and Höpner 2006), which at best only 
moderate changes of codetermination considered necessary and appropriate. 
Therefore, codetermination persists despite of shareholder-friendly reforms as 
an alien institutional element of the German political economy that potentially 
contradicts capital market pressures (Jürgens et al. 2000; Vitols 2004). As a 
result the pluralist legal structure of the corporation as laid down in corporate 
law (“Aktiengesetz”) remains untouched. A shareholder primacy has not been 
implemented and both managing and supervisory board members remain 
obliged to the “sustainable” prosperity of the corporation, which they should 
foster by balancing the interests of all relevant stakeholders. Also the provi-
sions of the German Corporate Governance Codex (GCGK) in several respects 
are an expression of the new orientations towards shareholder interests. How-
ever, the core of the codex advocates for a pluralist concept of the corporation 
and, with respect to the duties of the managing board, favors a stakeholder 
model even more pronouncedly than corporate law (see Regierungskommission 
Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2015, 5).  
Overall, this episode demonstrates that the new guiding ideas of financiali-
zation have been effective in several ways but remain contested as ideas and 
rival orientations have not been outcompeted. The new idea of “shareholder 
primacy“ (Stout 2012) has been translated into institutionally warranted rights 
for shareholders and obligations for the corporation and its managements and 
thus has been made behaviorally relevant (Lepsius 1997). However, this hap-
pened only partially and without completely replacing the basic concept of 
corporate order. Gregory Jackson (2005) characterizes this process as an incon-
sistent “institutional reconfiguration” of the corporation in the German political 
economy. Jackson and Sorge (2012) interpret the conflicting coexistence of 
institutional elements as “institutional layering” (according to Streeck and 
Thelen 2005b), which enables new practices without eliminating or disabling 
old ones. Regarding the interplay of potentially conflicting institutional rules 
some scholars put more emphasis on the “conversion” of codetermination; that 
is to say a shift in meaning by which codetermination becomes an element of a 
newly emerging “competitive coalition” (Lütz 2003; Höpner 2003). Other 
scholars underscored the translation or renegotiation of “Shareholder Value” 
under the adverse conditions of codetermination. The latter includes that capital 
market actors from foreign contexts may reinterpret their role in the institution-
ally and culturally “alien” context in which codetermination is taken for grant-
ed and has its advocates also among managers (see Goutas and Lane 2009; 
Jürgens et al. 2000; Vitols 2004; Faust et al. 2011). The tenor of the societal 
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and political controversies regarding the causes and effects of the great finan-
cial crisis in the following rather stabilizes a stakeholder-concept of the corpo-
ration demanding “sustainability” and “respectability” (“Ehrbarkeit”) of man-
agement. This is reflected in corresponding extensions of the Corporate 
Governance Kodex (Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance 
Kodex 2015, 1) and (moderate) corrections of the remuneration rules for man-
aging board members (see Wilke et al. 2011). Efforts for even more compre-
hensive re-reforms of corporate governance however, which could confine 
hedge fund activism more effectively or would strengthen codetermination 
rights, did not succeed. In the face of an incomplete and conflicting institution-
alization of the core ideas of financialization all conflicts regarding corporate 
strategies, labor policies, and labor relations are carried out in the emerging 
pluralist, but contradictory corporate order. All results regarding these policies 
are bound to the respective balance of power at industry or firm level, particu-
larly to the specific actor constellations and shared understandings of conflict 
regulation. 
4.2 Financialized Strategy Formation and Labor Relations in the 
German Chemical Industry 
In what follows we will present some aspects of financialization in the German 
chemical industry and the implication for labor standards and industrial relations 
(For a more detailed presentation see Kädtler 2009). 
The German chemical and pharmaceutical industry was dominated traditional-
ly by three corporations: Bayer, BASF, and Hoechst. Labor relations in these 
companies also were at the basis of the most cooperative and at the same time a 
particularly efficient form of German Social Partnership. The business model of 
the “Big Three” since the late 19th century had been founded on an economic and 
technical paradigm known as Verbundchemie – “joined-up chemistry.” The focus 
was not on ‘core competences’ defined by specific product or market segments 
but on optimizing and continuously developing a complex set of production and 
innovation capacities relating to a wide range of present and future products and 
markets. As a result, the “Big Three” covered more or less the whole spectrum of 
activities within the chemical industries, including pharmaceutical innovation, 
development, and production. 
This technology-accentuated economic paradigm depended on specific collec-
tive skills of companies’ workforce because of the complexity of the overall 
technological context. Therefore, it was traditionally superimposed by an unstint-
ing policy of corporate social integration, designed to ensure that employees were 
tied and committed to their respective firm on a long-term basis. The central 
actors of workers representation were co-opted as important members of the 
“dominant coalition” with far-reaching influence within the corporation as well as 
within the chemical workers union. The adoption of shareholder-value-
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management and a dominant focus on financial markets’ requirements as a mode 
of justifying corporate strategies caused radical change since the 1990s. Especial-
ly, synergies between different business areas, that used to be perceived as most 
important assets in the past were now declined as (forbidden) cross-subsidization, 
at least in two of the “Big Three.” One important implication has been the aban-
donment of the traditional link between chemicals and pharmaceuticals as a 
cornerstone of respective business strategies. 
Hoechst as the biggest of the three made several strategic moves within no 
more than ten years: from an industrial to a financial holding, followed by be-
coming part of a French-based “Life-Sciences-Company,” that soon became a 
“focused pharmaceutical company” and finally has been caught in to the French 
Sanofi SA as a result of a de facto hostile takeover. Striving during a couple of 
years to combine strong commitment to shareholder value with holding on indus-
trial synergies, Bayer ended up by adopting a strategy rather similar to that of 
Hoechst about ten years later, becoming a holding company focusing on pharma-
ceuticals, consumer care, and Crop Science as “Life Sciences.” 
In terms of wages and labor standards the result was manifold differentiation 
and fragmentation. While they developed rather stably for the minority of em-
ployees who were still part of the remaining core companies, there was signifi-
cant deterioration for those in business areas that were demerged. Worst off were 
many qualified workers in former departments of maintenance, who traditionally 
were at the core of unionization in these companies, and who have become part 
of external service providers.  
At BASF we find financialization to be similarly important. Instruments and 
procedures of value-based management (VBM) have been adopted, that only 
marginally differ from the system used by Bayer. Nevertheless the business strat-
egy differs completely. Where Bayer (and Hoechst) abandoned industrial chemis-
try business and focused on Life Sciences as core competences, in accordance 
with the dominant opinion on financial markets, BASF retained the technology-
based, multi-sector Verbund-strategy as core-competence and sold its pharmaceu-
tical business. When synergies were denounced as cross-subsidizing elsewhere, at 
BASF managers insisted on synergetic integration as a basic principle of corpo-
rate strategy. The company continues to be an integrated chemical corporation 
with homogeneous wage and labor standards. And the workers’ representatives 
continue to be highly influential. 
There are (at least) two main causes for this heterogeneity. One refers to the 
(non-financial) resource base, product strategy, and market conditions, the other 
to the foundations of workers’ representation in the past. Firstly, compared to 
Hoechst and Bayer, BASF’s pharmaceutical business had always been signifi-
cantly less important and less developed, while the company’s technological and 
market position in industrial chemistry was extremely strong. So, focusing on 
developing the latter, where the company used to earn a lot of money, the realistic 
option was to expect that analysts and investors in the end would not ignore 
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profitability. Secondly, at Hoechst and Bayer, financialization of corporate strate-
gies resulted in a complete dismantling of the formerly extremely influential 
positions of workers’ representatives. Exclusively focused on top-level arrange-
ments, they had neither strategy nor resources to meet management’s opting-out. 
When management abruptly cancelled the traditional model of corporate social 
partnership, they were moved from the center of decision-making to the sidelines. 
That does not mean that workers’ representation faded completely. But it has 
become reduced to negotiating more or less successfully on attenuating negative 
social outcomes of management strategies without influence on these strategies 
themselves. 
In contrast, the BASF works council always combined its strategy of corporate 
social partnership with strong unionization. Workers used to combine a strong 
commitment to the company with a strong commitment to union membership. So 
the management strategy of continuous restructuring and cost-cutting initiatives 
comes up with a workforce which is characterized by a specific combination of 
company spirit and union militancy. This is a particular explosive mix for BASF 
management, which depends, and must depend on its employees’ long-standing 
collective competence, when focusing on the Verbund strategy. Some furious 
work force protests in the 1990s and early 2000s strongly reminded management 
that it should continue to take this dependence seriously. 
It is important to see that those different strategies are not the outcome of 
“more” or “less” financialization. The downside of the strong continuity of BASF 
business strategy in terms of the real economy are the most extensive share-
repurchase schemes in German industry and a policy of continually rising divi-
dends, both supported by workers’ representatives. This can be taken as a show-
case of a continually renegotiated shareholder value (Vitols 2004) and at the same 
time a financialized version of social partnership (see also Faust 2011). 
5.  Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the specifics of the German case, regarding Favereau’s notion 
of an “unassailable” financialization the outline of the German case should 
have shown that the institutionalization of the ideas of financialization is in-
complete and contested and other forces are still relevant. Codetermination or 
more generally countervailing forces should not be introduced as a kind of deus 
ex machina in order to repel a “regime that could not be more firmly anchored, 
simultaneously at macroeconomic, managerial and anthropological levels” 
(Favereau 2016, 63), a juggernaut version of financialization. We should rather 
acknowledge in our analyses in how far, in which ways, and in which constel-
lations competing ideas remain relevant as a reference in both institutional 
reform processes and everyday decision-making at firm level, including labor 
relations. In doing so we should also avoid to attribute causation of all the 
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accounts of deteriorating labor conditions and relations (as outlined by Fa-
vereau’s “stylized facts”) to financialization. Labor conditions and labor rela-
tions change due to other influences (usual suspects: product and labor market 
globalization, liberalization policies, technological change) and are empirically 
not confined to the sectors in which financialization proceeds most (Faust and 
Thamm 2016). Although we lack comprehensive empirical studies, there is 
considerable evidence that the erosion of union density and of workers’ repre-
sentation by codetermination bodies is largest in smaller and younger compa-
nies in new industries in which family owners try to remain the master in their 
own house (“Herr im Hause”) (Ellguth and Trinczek 2016) whereas some of 
the listed corporation that are most exposed to capital markets are heavily un-
ionized and labor policy has to be negotiated with self-confident codetermina-
tion bodies at both plant and board level. Here, capital market expectations put 
the established labor relations under a new pressure. However, at the same time 
it has to be justified vis-à-vis and negotiated with institutionally authorized 
labor representatives, what a shareholder value orientation could mean, how to 
react to those pressures and what could be implications for labor. Respective 
power position additionally depend on rights anchored in labor law, collective 
bargaining, and labor market regulations as well as on what happens to sources 
of primary power of the respective workforce due to labor market conditions, 
technological change, and pressures from value chain reorganization and glob-
alization. Hence, what unions and works councils eventually have to concede 
in negotiations is not just a matter of the degree of financialization but of a 
variety of other structurations of the field and the respective company. 
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